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STATE ETHICAL CODES AND FEDERAL
PRACTICE: EMERGING CONFLICTS AND
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Stephen B. Burbank*
Approached literally or narrowly, the topic of emerging conflicts
posed by state ethical codes in federal practice is not very interesting.
When, however, one looks at the conflicts that have in fact occurred
and imagines those that could occur in the future, very interesting
questions about law and lawmaking are presented. The standards for
resolving putative conflicts between federal laws are not always clear,
and neither for that matter is the standard for determining what con-
stitutes a federal law capable of superseding effect. The technique of
setting federal norms of professional conduct on a decentralized basis
by borrowing or incorporating state norms is increasingly trouble-
some to the extent that the borrowed state norms are disuniform and
that they are being put to multiple remedial purposes. Federal legisla-
tion preempting state law of professional conduct is conceivable but
hardly likely, particularly as the norms are pressed into duty for pur-
poses other than professional discipline. Pending other steps that
might lead to national uniformity, the answer for the federal courts
may be a uniform set of norms directly regulating litigation conduct
in all federal courts.
If a provision in a state's code of professional conduct is in conflict
with federal law, we know how to resolve the conflict because the
Supremacy Clause tells us how.' To be sure, determining whether
there is pertinent and valid federal law conflicting with state law may
call for, as interstate choice of law often calls for, what Brainerd Cur-
* Robert G. Fuller, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. This is a
revised version of remarks at a panel discussion sponsored by the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York on March 19, 1992. I appreciate the helpful comments and
suggestions of Howard Lesnick, Curtis Reitz and Ned Spaeth.
1. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, No. 91-1425, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 22184 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 1992)(holding that
enforcement as state law of rule requiring prior judicial approval of federal subpoena to
attorney violates Supremacy Clause).
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rie termed "restraint and enlightenment."2 But a court's role and
function in answering the pertinence and validity questions is a far cry
from the freedom a state court enjoys in choosing the governing law
in an interstate case.
Most of the cases implicating state codes of professional conduct in
federal practice have not involved conflicts between federal and state
law. Rather, they have involved putatively conflicting federal norms,
one of which has been borrowed, usually as part of a wholesale opera-
tion, from state law or from ABA rules directly. In those cases, be-
cause state law norms of professional conduct or unmediated bar
association norms had been incorporated in local federal court rules,
there was no conflict for the Supremacy Clause to resolve. The con-
flicts and alleged conflicts between different types of federal law have
been anything but uninteresting, however.
In Rand v. Monsanto Co. 4 the question was whether a local district
court rule that directly incorporated DR 5-103(B) of the ABA's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which forbids ultimate
lawyer responsibility for legal costs, was consistent with Rule 23,6 the
national class action rule. Here again, there could be no doubt how to
resolve a conflict - a federal statute and a Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure both require that local district court rules be consistent with
national rules.7 The difficulty was determining how to formulate the
notion of consistency. On the assumption that the local rule required
a representative plaintiff personally to underwrite the costs of the
2. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 186, 604
(1963).
3. See Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law.- Sources of Authority and
Sources of Rules, 70 TEX. L. REV. - (forthcoming 1992). For an illuminating discussion
of the supremacy of pertinent (applicable) and valid federal law, see Peter Westen and
Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie after the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV.
311, 314, 318-21, 390-91 (1980).
4. 926 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1991).
5. Disciplinary Rule 5-103(B) provides:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litiga-
tion, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client,
except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, in-
cluding court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination,
and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ulti-
mately liable for such expenses.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1981).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
7. The statute requires that local court rules "shall be consistent with Acts of Con-
gress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title." 28
U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988). The rule empowers district courts to "make and amend rules
governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 83; cf FED. R.
CRIM. P. 57 (same).
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class action, the court held that it was inconsistent with Rule 23 "be-
cause it would cripple the class action device that rule creates."' In
reading Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Rand, one is struck by the
absence of attention to Supreme Court decisions that speak to the
question of consistency. Of the most important, Judge Easterbrook
cited only Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard,9 and he did not discuss it.' ° That
may be because the Court's cases provide so little guidance. 1
The same type of conflict arose in cases involving local district
court rules incorporating state rules that require prior judicial ap-
proval of subpoenas summoning attorneys before grand juries. In
those cases, the challenges to the local rules included claims that they
were inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or
with federal statutes. 2
In some cases, however, it has not been clear where in positive fed-
eral law to locate a conflict. In this category, it seems to me, are cases
in which federal prosecutors have argued, on the basis of the so-called
Thornburgh memorandum,' 3 that they are not subject to norms of
professional conduct, incorporated by local district court rules, that
prohibit ex parte contacts with represented individuals.' 4 Whatever
one thinks of the result in Rand, it is easy enough to understand how
8. Rand, 926 F.2d at 600.
9. 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
10. See Rand, 926 F.2d at 600-01. Prominently missing from Judge Easterbrook's
opinion were Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973), and Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641
(1960). Both cases dealt with, and adumbrated standards for resolving, alleged conflicts
between local and national rules.
11. See H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 27-28 (1985).
12. See Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania., 764 F. Supp.
328 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff'd, No. 91-1425, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 22184 (3d Cir. Sept. 16,
1992); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1986), aff'd on reh'g, 832 F.2d
664 (1st Cir. 1987)(en banc). In Baylson, the court of appeals held that a local district
court rule incorporating a state rule requiring prior judicial approval of subpoenas to
attorneys was invalid because inconsistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.
13. Memorandum from Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General to all Justice Depart-
ment Litigators (June 8, 1989). This memorandum takes the position that "the 'author-
ized by law' exemption in DR 7-104 applies to all communications with represented
individuals by Department attorneys or by others acting at their direction."
14. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991). Lopez
involved Rule 2-100 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California,
which "tracks the language of American Bar Association Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 7-
104 (A)(1) and ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2." Id. at 1444. The court
found that an "Assistant United States Attorney twice met with a represented and in-
dicted defendant in a criminal case and concealed those meetings from the defendant's
attorney." Id. at 1460. Finding further that, notwithstanding the Thornburgh memoran-
dum, this conduct constituted "an intentional violation of the long-standing ethical pro-
hibition, adopted by this court's Local Rules, which categorically proscribes contacts
between a prosecutor and a represented defendant without the knowledge and consent of
the defendant's attorney," id., the court dismissed the indictment. Id. at 1464.
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insistence on client responsibility for costs could eviscerate the small
claim class action.' 5 I have been unable to discover any such obvious
policy dissonance between the rule against ex parte contacts and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or pertinent federal statutes.
Perhaps that is because I do not believe that the various statutes and
federal rules governing the system of federal criminal law enforce-
ment are animated by a policy of convictions at any cost, and I can
think of no other policy that would require freedom for federal prose-
cutors to end-run the adversary system in precisely that context when
it is most important.' 6 For similar reasons, I do not believe an ipse
dixit, even from the Attorney General, should have the force of law
with the superseding effect of a statute or federal rule.
17
Apart from the standards for resolving conflicts between federal
laws, the borrowing of state (or ABA) norms of professional conduct
as federal law is itself of interest for a number of reasons, suggesting
the broader vistas of the topic.
So long as norms of professional conduct are substantially uniform
among the states, borrowing or incorporation in local district court
rules imports that uniformity into the federal system. State law
norms of professional conduct were substantially uniform after the
ABA's adoption of the Model Code of Professional Conduct, but they
have become progressively less uniform, at least in certain areas, since
the adoption of the Model Rules.'8 In other words, it appears that
interstate uniformity has diminished in recent years, and the resulting
interstate disuniformity is being translated into the federal system
through local rules.
The situation recalls the circumstances that prompted the ABA to
embark on its twenty year campaign for the Rules Enabling Act of
1934.19 Prior to that time, the procedure applied in actions at law in
the federal courts was predominantly state procedure imported "as
15. See Rand, 926 F.2d at 599.
16. See Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1463.
17. See id. at 1445-48, 1452-53. Finding that there "is no federal statute which au-
thorizes government attorneys to question represented parties in the absence of counsel,"
id. at 1448, the court concluded that if it accepted the Justice Department's argument, "it
is not clear that there would be any conduct the prosecutor could not undertake as long
as it was pursuant to his or her responsibility to investigate and prosecute crimes." Id.
(emphasis in original).
18. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 50 (1986).
19. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1048-98 (1982).
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near as may be" by command of the Conformity Act of 1872.20 The
ABA's call was for uniformity in the federal courts in the interest of
the multistate federal practitioner, with the subsidiary goals of im-
proving the procedure in those courts and inducing national uniform-
ity through state adoptions of the federal model.2'
The response to the phenomenon of imported disuniformity in
norms of professional conduct suggested by this history would be uni-
form federal law for the federal courts and only the federal courts,
along the lines of the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure.
Imported disuniformity is a self-inflicted wound; the federal courts
have chosen to borrow and to do so on a decentralized basis. Surely,
the federal judiciary has the means to solve the problem, one way or
another, by requiring federal uniformity.22 From that perspective, it
is a shame that the Judicial Conference's Local Rules Project stopped
studying problems of disuniformity in bar admission and discipline
matters.23
However superficially alluring, a comparison of disuniformity in
norms of professional conduct in federal court today to the situation
under the Conformity Act of 1872 is of limited utility. Rules of pro-
cedure may differ from state to state, but they rarely present choice of
law difficulties.24 Differences in norms of professional conduct, on the
other hand, can present very difficult choice of law questions in the
conduct of an attorney's practice. 25  Thus, uniform professional
norms applicable only in federal court practice may be an inadequate
response, except perhaps for attorneys who practice exclusively in fed-
20. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197. See Burbank, supra note 19,
at 1039-42.
21. See Burbank, supra note 19, at 1040-50.
22. To the extent that uniform federal norms could fairly be described as norms of
litigation conduct, see infra note 48 and accompanying text, they could be promulgated
by the Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). A
more ambitious effort, comparable in scope to the Model Code or the Model Rules,
would be hard to justify under that authority. But there may be more than one route to
uniformity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 2071 (1988); Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of
Local Rules, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62.
23. See Letter from Mary P. Squiers, Local Rules Project, Judicial Conference of the
United States, to Professor Stephen B. Burbank, University of Pennsylvania Law School
(June 19, 1989) (on file with author).
24. The traditional choice of law rule looking to the law of the forum for matters of
"procedure" has proved both broad and durable. For recent progress in breaking it
down, by subjecting statutes of limitations to normal conflicts techniques, see RESTATE-
MENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS (1986 rev.) § 142 (1988). But cf. Sun
Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (forum may constitutionally apply its statute of
limitations to lawsuit brought in its courts).
25. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 50-51; Joanne Pitulla, Mixed Messages,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1992, at 93.
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eral court (such as some employees of the United States government).
For other attorneys it is often no easier to predict whether, if a trans-
action grows into a dispute that in turn blossoms into litigation, the
case will end up in federal or state court than it is to predict in what
state litigation may be filed. In any event, even accepting the need for
uniform rules applicable in federal litigation, that need hardly seems
adequate justification by itself for federalizing the entire corpus of
norms of professional conduct, including those which are directed to
other (non-litigation) contexts.
Perhaps, however, it is time to think seriously of a national bar,
governed by uniform federal norms of professional conduct in all
practice contexts, including in state and federal court. After all, we
have gone some way down that road with the use of the multistate bar
examination for admissions, and the way exists to share discipline in-
formation, if only there were a will.26 Are the benefits derived from
state autonomy and experimentation - how much experimentation is
there? - worth the costs of conflict in an age when multistate trans-
actions have become commonplace? Obviously, any serious thinking
along these lines would need to include the problem of enforcement,
which lurks beneath the surface of much of the mischief that plagues
us today.
In thinking about the costs resulting from conflicts in norms of pro-
fessional conduct and about the drastic remedy of federal preemption
of state law, it may be important to recognize that those norms are
being asked to play more roles today than was traditionally the case.
If a lawyer guesses wrong about the norm of professional conduct
applicable to a particular transaction or in a particular situation, the
result may not be simply discipline from the state bar. Indeed, the
fact that discipline was unlikely to follow may have increased pressure
for alternative enforcement vehicles. Today the result may be dis-
qualification in litigation or a malpractice judgment.28 Indeed, if the
recent past is prologue, the result may even be furnishing the predi-
cate for a government enforcement action in which an entire law
firm's assets are at risk.29
The phenomenon of multi-purpose professional norms is, of course,
26. See Burton C. Agata, Admissions and Discipline of Attorneys in Federal District
Courts.: A Study and Proposed Rules, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 249, 281-82 (1975).
27. See id. at 280-83; Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Proceed-
ings 9-10 (1984).
28. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 18, at 51-53.
29. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Due Process for Kaye, Scholer?, LEGAL TIMES,
March 16, 1992, at 39; infra note 34 and accompanying text.
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another form of borrowing or incorporation. Apart from the impact
it may have in raising the costs of conflicting norms of professional
conduct and the states' stake in preserving their lawmaking auton-
omy, the phenomenon deserves discrete attention. We have begun to
acknowledge that norms of professional conduct may vary depending
on an attorney's role.30 The summary of Professor Hazard's expert
opinion for Kaye, Scholer suggests that he placed great weight on the
contention that the firm's lawyers were acting as litigation counsel.3'
Whatever the truth as to that, isn't it odd that at the same time we are
recognizing the different roles that lawyers play, we should increas-
ingly turn to the norms of professional conduct as a substitute for
thought about conduct that warrants various forms of legal and equi-
table relief? From that perspective, it may not have been wise to write
standards of disqualification into the norms of professional conduct,32
and one should applaud the Delaware Supreme Court's insistence that
they be kept separate.33 Resort to the disqualification remedy can
muddy the waters about responsibility for, as well as the content of,
the underlying norms.
But we have gone far beyond using norms of professional conduct
as the yardstick of disqualification or malpractice liability, as is evi-
dent when we see the Office of Thrift Supervision relying on supposed
"breaches of professional responsibility" 34 for its temporary order to
cease and desist against Kaye, Scholer, or for that matter when we see
the sketch of Kaye, Scholer's defense provided by Professor Hazard. 35
It appears that the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers project is pursuing a transremedial approach, for-
mulating norms on the basis of sources involving multiple remedial
30. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, preamble (1983); GEOF-
FREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978).
31. See Summary of the Expert Opinion of Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (Feb. 25, 1992)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Summary of Expert Opinion]. Kaye, Scholer retained
Professor Hazard to "testify generally concerning standards of professional conduct and
ethical rules applicable to attorneys who act in the capacity of litigation counsel, as well
as the generally accepted standards by which statements of such counsel on behalf of
their clients have been understood to be judged." Id. at 1. Settlement rendered such
testimony unnecessary.
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983).
33. See In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215 (Del. 1990); see also Hizey
v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1992) (trial court correctly excluded testimony and
jury instructions referring to Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct in legal malpractice action).
34. In re Peter M. Fishbein, OTS AP-92-20 (March 1, 1992) (temporary order to
cease and desist).
35. See Summary of Expert Opinion, supra note 31.
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contexts, from disqualification to malpractice litigation. 6 The Re-
porters apparently contemplate "unfurling the separate flags"3  in
their multi-purpose norms through discrete remedial provisions.38 If
so, they should consider that, whatever other problems that approach
poses, it places a high premium on the ability to foresee all the various
uses to which a norm may be put, what might be called remedial sta-
sis. The ability to do that surely is not one of the lessons of Kaye,
Scholer.
If one regards national uniformity as important but not sufficiently
important to justify federal legislation preempting state law, there
may be alternative strategies worth considering. I doubt that the
ABA could be, or that it should be, motivated to revisit the subject.
One could put the matter in the hands of the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, recognizing that the Commissioners have on occa-
sion couched their product in a form suitable for embodiment in court
rules as well as legislation.39 In order to solve the problem created by
a separate system of federal courts, however, it would still be neces-
sary to have uniform federal court rules incorporating the resulting
Uniform Rules."°
In the absence of steps such as these designed to make the norms of
professional conduct nationally uniform, the situation in federal
courts requires attention. As a first step, local district court rules that
incorporate more than one set of rules of professional conduct should
be amended. In a recent case in federal court in Utah, multiple bor-
rowing proved not to be a problem because the Utah Rules and the
36. We take this occasion to remind readers that, as with all work on this Re-
statement of the Law Governing Lawyers, this draft aims to restate the law. It
reflects decisional law and statutes and takes account of the lawyer codes in its
formulations. The formulations are a statement of the law applicable in mal-
practice and disqualification proceedings and other contexts to which that body
of law is applicable. It also may inform the interpretation of the lawyer codes in
disciplinary and similar proceedings.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS xxiii-xxiv (Tentative Draft No. 5,
1992).
37. Katz v. Realty Equities Corp. of New York, 521 F.2d 1354, 1358 (2d Cir. 1975).
In Katz, the district judge justified an order requiring a consolidated complaint for pre-
trial purposes on the ground that it "would be useful and efficient and could be without
prejudice to unfurling the separate flags at trial, if necessary, to protect any legitimate
interests that may have to be dealt with separately." Id. The court of appeals' opinion
upholding the order does not persuade me that any harm could be undone.
38. See Letter from Curtis R. Reitz to Professor Stephen Burbank, University of
Pennsylvania Law School (Sept. 20, 1990) (on file with author).
39. See UNIF. R. EvID. (1986).
40. See supra note 22.
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ABA Model Rules provisions - the local rule incorporated both -
were found to be identical.4 What if, as increasingly seems possible,
4 2
the multiple incorporated provisions are flatly inconsistent? Choice of
law problems in a multistate practice situation are bad enough, but
conflicts within the norms applicable in one court are inexcusable.
More generally, the practice of borrowing or incorporating state or
bar association norms of professional conduct in federal local court
rules deserves attention for reasons independent of the disuniformity
that can result. Borrowing has been justified as an appropriate means
to avoid the costs of intrastate disuniformity and to take advantage of
state enforcement mechanisms.43 For these purposes, we should per-
haps distinguish between (1) borrowing rules at retail, that is, after
determining their appropriateness for the particular federal purpose,
and (2) the wholesale borrowing of a body of rules." One's comfort
with the second type of borrowing may depend on the confidence one
has that the borrowed corpus of law fits well with the system into
which it is being imported,45 the willingness of the borrower to police
the system for inconsistencies, and the ability of the borrower to deal
promptly and effectively with inconsistencies.46
If disuniformity is increasing among the states, that is reason
enough to be uncomfortable with the wholesale borrowing of state
rules of professional conduct by federal courts. Certainly that is the
case if such rules are to be borrowed for purposes other than bar disci-
pline. There are limits to the federal interest in rules of professional
conduct for application only in federal court, and state enforcement
mechanisms are of limited effectiveness. Perhaps it is time to finish
the job of recognizing the many roles that lawyers play and thereby
reverse the trend toward proliferating the remedial purposes to which
professional norms are put. Perhaps it is time for uniform federal
rules of federal litigation conduct backed up by uniform federal en-
forcement mechanisms. An ancillary benefit of such a lawmaking en-
41. See Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Wasatch Bank, 139 F.R.D. 412, 414 (D. Utah
1991).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Walsh, 699 F. Supp. 469, 470-71 (D.N.J. 1988); supra
note 18 and accompanying text.
43. United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1200 (3d Cir. 1980).
44. Cf. Burbank, supra note 19, at 1037 (distinguishing on this basis early statutes
requiring federal courts to apply state law).
45. But see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 96 (1974) ("usually legal rules are
not peculiarly devised for the particular society in which they now operate and... this is
not a matter of great concern").
46. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 694-96 (1988) (costs of federal
borrowing of state limitations law).
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terprise might be hastening the demise of provisions like Rule 1117
that obliquely and fecklessly regulate litigation conduct in federal
court today.48
Legal borrowing may reflect simply a concession to the shortness of
life. It may also reflect deference to another legal system. The federal
courts can no longer afford to defer to the states regarding the norms
of professional conduct applicable in federal practice. The costs of
that approach are increasing for the courts themselves, lawyers and
their clients. As norms of professional conduct are pressed into ser-
vice for purposes other than professional discipline, however, it be-
comes clear that control of the legal profession is the central issue in
fact as well as in theory. A posture of deference to state law makes it
harder for the federal courts to resist assertions of power from else-
where in the federal government. Equally important, that posture
makes it harder for the federal courts to deal effectively, by dealing
directly, with problems of professional misconduct in federal practice.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
48. See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Proce-
dure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989).
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